Tolerancia adaptativa del soborno en el sistema-mundo
Resumen
En este artículo se aborda un análisis comparado de los factores micro y macrosociales que influyen en la tolerancia hacia el soborno en 64 países, utilizando datos de la World Values Survey (2017–2022). A partir de un enfoque teórico que integra mecanismos individuales, evaluaciones de legitimidad institucional y la posición estructural de los países en el sistema-mundo, se estima un modelo multinivel que permite distinguir entre efectos individuales y contextuales. Para ello, se adopta una estrategia metodológica basada en modelos de regresión multinivel, que permite tener en cuenta la estructura jerárquica de los datos —individuos anidados en países—, descomponer la varianza entre niveles, y estimar de forma simultánea el efecto de las características individuales y de las condiciones estructurales asociadas a la posición de los países en el sistema-mundo. Los resultados muestran, que la tolerancia al soborno se incrementa significativamente en países semiperiféricos y periféricos, incluso controlando por predictores individuales, lo que respalda la hipótesis de que la baja institucionalidad y la desigualdad estructural y dependencia económica generan normas adaptativas, familismo amoral y mayor permisividad. Asimismo, ser mujer, mayor de edad y mayor nivel educativo, reducen dicha puntuación. El estudio contribuye a una teoría de rango medio, proponiendo el concepto de “tolerancia adaptativa”, para integrar estructuras globales y dinámicas individuales en la explicación de la tolerancia delictiva.
Palabras clave: dependencia, sistema-mundo, institucionalidad, legitimidad, tolerancia adaptativa, privación relativa
Adaptive Tolerance towards Bribery in the World-System
Abstract
In this article, a comparative analysis of tolerance toward bribery is undertaken using a multilevel approach that integrates individual and contextual factors across 64 countries from the World Values Survey (2017–2022). The theoretical framework combines evaluations of institutional legitimacy—both diffuse and specific—with countries’ structural positions within the core–semiperiphery–periphery hierarchy of the world-system. To this end, a multilevel methodological strategy is employed, accounting for the hierarchical structure of the data—individuals nested within countries—allowing for the decomposition of variance across levels and the simultaneous estimation of the effects of individual characteristics and structural conditions. The results show that tolerance toward bribery is primarily driven by individual-level factors; however, it also exhibits a significant contextual component, as residing in semiperipheral or peripheral countries systematically increases its justification, even after controlling for sociodemographic and attitudinal variables. These findings suggest that structural conditions such as economic dependency, institutional weakness, and inequality shape normative frameworks that facilitate the adaptive justification of illicit behavior. The article contributes to the literature by proposing the concept of “adaptive tolerance” as a middle-range theoretical mechanism linking structural constraints and individual dispositions in explaining tolerance toward bribery.
Keywords: dependency, world-system, institutional quality, legitimacy, adaptive tolerance, relative deprivation
ARK CAICYT: https://id.caicyt.gov.ar/ark:/s16668979/cp1z2l979
Texto completo:
PDFDOI: https://doi.org/10.62174/arg.2026.11230
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